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Chapter 3 1 
Trust and Mutual Recognition in the Services 2 
Directive 3 
Gareth Davies 4 
I. Introduction 5 
To portray mutual recognition between States and central legislation only as 6 
alternatives is to give an overly static picture of their role and effects. In any 7 
realistic attempt at market-making they are intertwined and interdependent, 8 
and the concept of trust plays an important role in explaining the relation 9 
between them. In particular, whereas mutual recognition is usually said to 10 
require trust as a precondition, harmonizing legislation has trust as its effect, 11 
and sometimes its goal313. Yet this observation immediately shows how 12 
central legislation may in fact serve to create the conditions for decentralized 13 
mutual recognition, provided that post-legislative discretionary space 14 
remains. 15 
Nicolaidis suggests that an important way in which legislation 16 
creates trust and promotes mutual recognition is by creating mechanisms of 17 
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‘mutual monitoring’ and ‘reciprocal spying’ which prevent States from 1 
‘cheating’314. The core insight is that where States have knowledge of each 2 
others rules and practices they are inhibited from adopting regulation that 3 
deviates too far from accepted norms or that fundamentally undermines the 4 
interests of their partners315. To do so would risk these partners calling into 5 
questions the fundamentals of the mutual recognition system, and 6 
threatening precisely the trading profits that the State is trying to win. 7 
Incomplete harmonisation, focusing on co-ordination and transparency, may 8 
therefore serve to facilitate and stabilize mutual recognition. 9 
Kerber and Van den Bergh, among others, have described the other 10 
side of the coin, how mutual recognition promotes harmonisation316. They 11 
take the view that mutual recognition creates instability, a dynamic principle 12 
one of whose major functions is to provoke the vertical reallocation of 13 
powers. They point out that mutual recognition confronts jurisdictions with 14 
each other’s rules, revealing and contrasting the differences. Stable mutual 15 
recognition may emerge if the differences are unimportant. However, it is 16 
just as likely, perhaps more likely in the current state of European 17 
integration, that this confrontation will serve to highlight the need for future 18 
substantive harmonisation. In other words, the extent to which States can 19 
tolerate each other’s regulation is not always clear until they try, and trying 20 
may be exactly what persuades them that harmonisation is a preferable 21 
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alternative to tolerance317. The resulting harmonisation may be substantive, 1 
but it may also have communicative elements, aimed at increasing 2 
knowledge of each other’s rules, moving from what Nicolaidis calls ‘blind 3 
trust’ to what she calls ‘binding trust’318. The resulting mutual recognition 4 
may then be stretched by entrepreneurial States or economic actors until it 5 
reaches the limits of the newly established trust, leading to new calls for 6 
legislative intervention, so that, as she puts it ‘a new cycle then begins’319. 7 
Into this context of an unstable and dynamic relationship between 8 
mutual recognition and harmonizing legislation, between the legislator and 9 
the courts, this article offers the services directive as an example of the ideas 10 
above at work. It suggests that the directive is not of great substantive 11 
import, but is primarily a communicative measure, which in turn may make 12 
the substantive rules on free movement of services – which are greatly 13 
composed of mutual recognition – effective. 14 
II. The services directive 15 
The services directive has been presented as an attempt to create a single 16 
market for services by laying down clear and far-reaching rules on free 17 
movement320. These are intended to create sufficient rights for providers, 18 
and impose sufficient constraints on public authorities, so that free 19 
movement will become a reality. Given that the continued existence of 20 
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diverse national standards and regulatory approaches within a single market 1 
can create problems of competition and consumer protection, the directive 2 
also contains feedback mechanisms aiming to provide a basis for future 3 
harmonisation to deal with these problems. The directive thus appears to 4 
envisage a sequential process that can be briefly summarized as (1) create 5 
the market (2) analyse the problems created (3) take the necessary 6 
compensating measures. 7 
It is argued here that this is not an adequate description of how the 8 
directive will work. The primary problem of the internal market is not an 9 
absence of far-reaching free movement rules. These exist already as a result 10 
of the Treaties and the jurisprudence of the Court. Rather, the lack of free 11 
movement in practice results from a lack of motivation on the part of the 12 
States to implement these rules, a considerable room for discretion which 13 
allows States to de facto restrict such implementation, and an absence of any 14 
Union-level measures addressing these problems of enforcement and 15 
implementation. The rules already exist, but there is sufficient room for 16 
States to hinder their effective use, and this they do. 17 
The directive does not address these enforcement and 18 
implementation issues and does not take the substantive rules on free 19 
movement much further than the current position. The directive will 20 
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therefore not be sufficient to directly create a single market. Its contribution 1 
to the substantive right of free movement is relatively slight. 2 
Instead, the directive does something else. It provides for increased 3 
transparency in many ways, and for increased communication between 4 
national authorities in different States. This may help create trust between 5 
national authorities, and can be more specifically analysed using the theories 6 
of oligopoly and of regulatory competition. The limited number of States 7 
involved in the internal market suggests that the directive may encourage 8 
regulatory collusion. States may voluntarily converge towards consensual 9 
standards and regulatory approaches that protect each State against 10 
regulatory pressure from migrant businesses, their customers in the market 11 
for regulation. 12 
It remains to be seen whether this is beneficial or not. In general, 13 
collusion enabling providers to act independently of customers is not to be 14 
welcomed, but where those providers are of laws and enjoy democratic 15 
legitimacy, whereas the customers – mobile businesses – do not, co-16 
operation between national authorities may be a desirable counter-balance to 17 
the risks of migration-fuelled regulatory competition. Moreover, the 18 
resulting trust may lead to an increase in free movement, as States apply free 19 
movement rules more leniently and co-operatively to partner States with 20 
which they have reached a regulatory understanding. 21 
Chapter 3 
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In any case, oligopoly theory suggests that the services directive 1 
should be viewed in a slightly different light from the usual one in which it 2 
is presented. It appears to have a reflexive character, and to create a 3 
mechanism for convergence of rules which is unusual in being consensual, 4 
variable and dynamic, and entirely decentralized, and in which the 5 
Commission is potentially marginalized. The services directive may also 6 
turn out to be effective at creating an Internal Market, but via the creation of 7 
trust and understanding between States, rather than via the toughness of its 8 
rules on free movement. 9 
The following sections elaborate on this. In turn they consider (i) the 10 
problems which a legal attempt to create a single market for services has to 11 
address; (ii) whether the directive provides an effective free movement 12 
regime, and (iii) whether its communication and information provisions will 13 
contribute to voluntary convergence, and to inter-State trust and acceptance, 14 
and thereby indirectly leads to a working single market. 15 
III. The problems of the single market for services 16 
Insofar as the absence of a working single market for services can be 17 
attributed to legal failure, that failure can be most plausibly located in one or 18 
both of two places. On the one hand, it is arguable that the rights of free 19 
movement on which the market is based are insufficiently clear or far-20 
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reaching; they do not sufficiently constitute the market. On the other hand, 1 
whether or not those rules are in principle adequate, it is arguable that States 2 
do not implement or comply with them with enough enthusiasm or good 3 
faith, and the rules are not sufficiently enforceable to overcome the obstacles 4 
that this lack of national goodwill creates. The problems can thus be divided 5 
into those of substance, and those of enforcement and implementation. 6 
Sustaining both of these problems is a deeper, non-legal one, which 7 
may be called the problem of trust. States are not motivated to fully apply 8 
free movement rules, because they do not have faith that this is in their own 9 
interests, for a number of reasons. They exploit the defects of the law 10 
because they can, and because they want to. This is something that requires 11 
attention in itself. 12 
A. Inadequacies in the substantive rules 13 
Under the current interpretation of the Treaty, the application of any national 14 
measure which might tend to make the cross-border provision of services or 15 
establishment less attractive, or might hinder it in any way, is in principle 16 
prohibited unless the State in question can show that the application is 17 
necessary to achieve a justified goal, and is proportionate321. A body of case 18 
law makes clear that proportionality is to be interpreted in a free-movement-19 
friendly way, and the Court subjects national measures to strict, even 20 
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sceptical, scrutiny322. In the course of interpreting proportionality it has laid 1 
down a number of rules to this effect. For example, national rules must not 2 
attempt to duplicate requirements contained in home State laws323, 3 
administrative requirements on service providers must be cheap, simple, and 4 
completion may not be a pre-requisite for starting work324, and the consumer 5 
must be treated as reasonably self-sufficient, so that imposition of 6 
paternalistic standards will not be permitted325. 7 
In substance, these comprise a far-reaching market manifesto, and 8 
full compliance would result in a market in which movement between States 9 
was hardly more difficult than internal movement. In fact this is a 10 
formulation that the Court has on occasion used; application of rules making 11 
cross-border movement harder than domestic is prohibited326. There is the 12 
market then; Voilà! If compliance could be assumed, the market would exist 13 
already. 14 
However, a practical problem with the substantive law is its high 15 
degree of abstraction. What is ‘justified’ and ‘proportionate’ is open to 16 
argument, and while a distinct philosophy emerges from the case law of the 17 
Court of Justice, this is less accessible and forceful than explicit and specific 18 
rules would be327. Moreover, the Court links its decisions to the individual 19 
facts, meaning that it is always open for a Member State to argue that the 20 
facts in a subsequent case justify drawing the line in a different place328. 21 
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Necessity, justification and proportionality remain negotiated, ambiguous, 1 
open-textured concepts. 2 
Moreover, the status of judicial interpretations as law is not self-3 
evident in all Member States. The degree to which the Court of Justice’s 4 
pronouncements should be abstracted and treated as generally binding 5 
interpretations of the Treaty – even if expressed as such is not settled 6 
decisively as a matter of doctrine329. Nor, as a matter of practice, can judicial 7 
statements be expected to have the same general impact on regulatory 8 
authorities as a written law would have. 9 
To the EU specialist, the substantive law is therefore remarkably 10 
complete and powerful. The ‘right’ interpretation – that the Court of Justice 11 
would give in a case – is not too hard to predict, and it allocates free movers 12 
a high degree of protection against national regulatory hindrance. However, 13 
that law is not formulated in a way that will have maximum practical impact 14 
on the authorities required to apply it, and so does not fulfil its own 15 
potential. 16 
B. The problems of implementation and enforcement 17 
If States simply snub their noses at the law then one might speak of legal 18 
delinquency, and the solution would not necessarily lie in better rules but in 19 
enforcement mechanisms. However, there are ways of resisting full 20 
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application that fall short of such outright legal rebellion330. Primarily, in the 1 
context of the internal market, States may take a stance on the ambiguous 2 
concepts of necessity, justification and proportionality that is favourable to 3 
national interests or the regulatory status quo, and relatively unfavourable to 4 
free movement. By doing so they can effectively block free movement by 5 
continuing to apply restrictive national rules, claiming that these are 6 
genuinely necessary and justified. 7 
The State might lose if the matter is appealed all the way to the Court 8 
of Justice, but this is barely relevant in practice. Firstly, commercial reality 9 
entails that service providers do not have years to spare for a protracted legal 10 
fight. Thus, in practice the initial position of a State on the legitimacy of its 11 
national laws is the one that the service provider will generally have to live 12 
with. The theoretical possibility of legal challenge, particularly given the 13 
speed of most legal systems, not to mention costs, is not a viable basis for a 14 
working free movement regime. Secondly, even if legal challenge does 15 
result in a rejection of the State’s regulatory provision and a vindication of 16 
free movement, the State is still able to treat the judgment as restricted to the 17 
facts, and to continue its restrictive behaviour in other spheres. 18 
Member States are therefore able to exploit the lack of clarity of the 19 
law to claim that particular restrictive measures are in fact necessary and 20 
proportionate. Debunking such conservative readings of the law requires 21 
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engagement with the nuances of EU law, which in reality entails an 1 
impractical level of litigation. The ambiguity of free movement law is 2 
therefore widely seen as a major reason for its limited effectiveness in 3 
practice331. 4 
EU law does not address these enforcement problems . It does 5 
require that judicial protection of EU rights be ‘effective’, and the Court – 6 
and the directive – have laid down some further requirements332, but the 7 
standards resulting do not require a legal process sufficiently speedy and 8 
accessible to meet the demands of commercial reality for small to medium-9 
sized service providers. Nor could this be so; it would amount to a 10 
revolution in domestic legal systems. 11 
Most importantly, nothing in EU law makes it wrongful for a State to 12 
consistently take a conservative approach to the interpretative space that the 13 
law offers. The fact that time after time States take positions that EU law 14 
specialists consider highly unlikely to survive the scrutiny of the Court of 15 
Justice does not in itself amount to a violation of EU law, nor attract 16 
punishment or criticism from the Court of Justice or Commission. Each case 17 
is decided on its merits, and the fact that a State has fought and lost 18 
analytically similar cases in the past is not relevant to the outcome, nor even 19 
to a claim for damages, unless those cases are so similar as to be identical – 20 
which given the open texture of the law is always arguably not the case333. 21 
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The sanction for a wrongful standpoint is generally no more than being 1 
required to change that particular standpoint if the case is ultimately litigated 2 
and lost. 3 
The fact that a State consistently takes losing legal positions on free 4 
movement is therefore merely part of the legal game. This is probably 5 
inevitable. The same applies to appeals within a domestic legal system; the 6 
fact that a judgment is overturned on appeal, or even that a court finds its 7 
judgments often overturned on appeal to the extent that it attracts a 8 
reputation as particularly conservative or radical or whatever, does not 9 
render that court or its judgments illegitimate or subject to sanctions. 10 
Respect for judicial independence is too high to permit this. A similar logic 11 
may be applied to national regulatory authorities. Moreover, the problem is 12 
not just with such authorities. National judges tend to defer to governmental 13 
assessments of necessity and proportionality334, and once again, the mere 14 
fact of being consistently wrong does not attract sanctions. 15 
Given the room which the open-textured nature of free movement 16 
law leaves for interpretation there is therefore nothing in EU law to prevent 17 
national authorities and courts from consistently taking conservative and 18 
free movement-unfriendly positions with respect to the application of 19 
national rules. They are in principle obliged to follow the Court’s 20 
interpretations, but are neither sanctioned nor prevented if they interpret 21 
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autonomously and divergently. De facto, EU law does not guarantee free 1 
movement rights. 2 
C. The problem of trust 3 
Although the law leaves room for States to resist free movement, this does 4 
not necessarily mean that they will choose to do so. However, the fact that a 5 
single market for services is not considered to exist suggests that to a 6 
considerable extent such resistance does occur. 7 
This situation may be described by saying that States and national 8 
authorities clearly exercise their interpretative discretion in a way that 9 
favours national interests more, and free movement less, than EU law would 10 
prefer. There is obviously a perception in the States that maximizing free 11 
movement by seeking to minimise the obstacles caused by national 12 
regulation is not in fact in the national interest or in the interest of the 13 
regulatory authority in question and/or its direct clients. 14 
The most obvious basis for this view is the perception that other 15 
States do not regulate adequately, or as well as the host State, so that 16 
admitting foreign service providers without subjecting them to the full range 17 
of national regulatory demands undermines quality on the local market to 18 
the detriment of local consumers. This perception is not likely to be based 19 
on a deep knowledge of foreign rules or inadequacies, but is the result of a 20 
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precautionary approach which in turn is probably based partly on a 1 
presumption of local superiority, and partly on the natural inertia and 2 
suspicion of non-conformity that one may attribute to institutions generally. 3 
However, it is suggested that this concern for consumers is not likely 4 
to be the major motivation for restricting market access. Consumer 5 
protection is often a repackaging of concerns about unfair competition, and 6 
in these cases the primary objection to exemption from local rules for 7 
foreign economic actors is the perception that this is unfair335. This is partly 8 
based on the substantive argument that through exemption they gain a 9 
market advantage over domestic competitors, by being subject to a lesser 10 
regulatory burden, and partly based on the formal view that all should be 11 
treated identically, a view which has strong European roots and has 12 
considerable legal and philosophical capital in the Member States336. There 13 
is a resistance to the argument that because some actors are different they 14 
deserve to be treated differently. In this case that argument would suggest 15 
that those subject to the regulation of their home State deserve to 16 
consequently have a different status under the regulation of the host State, 17 
but the concept of exemptions for difference is resisted on far more general 18 
and philosophical grounds, linked to matters such as the unity of the State 19 
and the blindness of public authority to categories of citizens337. 20 
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Less philosophically and more practically, national authorities may 1 
resist to free movement out of concerns about where it will take them. The 2 
idea of special legal treatment for foreign-based providers entails a form of 3 
regulatory competition which is highly contested, and in fact probably 4 
rejected by most members of the European political class and the European 5 
public338. It raises the spectre of the race to the bottom, and States may resist 6 
free market access because they fear that if they are too open they will (a) 7 
encourage domestic firms to relocate abroad to low-regulation States, and 8 
(b) be participating in a game which will lead to a spiralling down of 9 
regulatory standards, not only harming national interests but also reducing 10 
national control over the quality of national markets339. Regulatory 11 
competition is a significant threat to the substantive regulatory autonomy of 12 
States, and it is hardly surprising therefore that they seek to resist forms of 13 
free movement which entail this340. Indeed, one of the issues which the law 14 
of the internal market has failed to address adequately is the fact that 15 
regulatory authorities often do not in fact appear to accept the fundamental 16 
principles upon which the internal market is based; that economic actors 17 
should be able to operate throughout the EU while only being subject to a 18 
single regulatory jurisdiction. By contrast, both governments and the public 19 
are probably more sympathetic to a ‘when in Rome do as Romans do’ rule; 20 
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if you want to do business in X, comply with its rules341. The justice of this 1 
is certainly easier to explain and to grasp. 2 
Finally, there is the issue of reciprocity. While economists may 3 
suggest that it is beneficial to open one’s markets even if partner States do 4 
not do the same, this view does not attract much political support. Given the 5 
weaknesses of the law, open markets are not beyond question, and it may be 6 
assumed that States fear that if they are too obedient to EU law for their own 7 
good they will be in the position of having their domestic markets 8 
‘plundered’ by foreign providers while their own providers will be unable to 9 
gain access to markets abroad. This is a situation which could be analysed in 10 
game theoretical terms. Even if States believe in open markets generally, 11 
given that they also believe in reciprocity they are unlikely to make the first 12 
move unless they have some mechanism for protecting themselves against 13 
misuse of this generosity by their neighbours. This protection could lie in the 14 
possibility to reclose markets, but a sense of protection could also arise from 15 
a mechanism for creating trust between authorities in different States. 16 
The problems may be summarized by saying that there is a lack of 17 
trust in foreign standards, and a lack of faith in the concepts underlying the 18 
EU market regime and in that regime as a whole342. States do not appear to 19 
feel confident that opening their markets to non-compliant service providers 20 
from other jurisdictions will not lead to serious local economic and social 21 
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harm, largely because they fear that other jurisdictions do, or will, adopt low 1 
standards, and that they will be caught in the pincer between the need to 2 
prevent businesses leaving the country, and the desire to regulate in 3 
accordance with local preferences. 4 
D. Ways of addressing the legal problems 5 
Measures to increase the effectiveness of free movement law might take one 6 
of a number of forms. The most obvious would be to reduce the ambiguity 7 
which enables national resistance. This could be done by legislation spelling 8 
out the content of free movement law in a more precise and specific way. It 9 
could also be done by giving a procedural content to the assessment of 10 
necessity, justification and proportionality343. Providing lists of relevant 11 
factors and guidelines for their use would constrain national authorities and 12 
result in less deviation from the Court’s preferred interpretative approach. 13 
Another way of increasing effectiveness would be for EU law to 14 
directly address the procedural problems of enforcement – for example 15 
requiring extra-speedy judicial processes or appeals, or imposing a 16 
presumption of free movement rights while a case is pending. This approach 17 
is unlikely to be followed because of the degree to which it imposes on 18 
national legal systems and domestic procedure. 19 
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A third way is to address the issues of trust and motivation, to create 1 
a situation in which States perceive opening their markets to foreign service 2 
providers to be in their own interests, or to raise no or limited conflicts with 3 
other interests. 4 
The following two sections consider the extent to which the services 5 
directive offers any solutions such as these. 6 
IV. The services directive as a regime for free movement 7 
and regulatory competition 8 
The directive is presented as legislation promoting free movement by 9 
enacting free movement rights. This view is unsatisfying for three reasons. 10 
Firstly, the directive barely changes the existing law. Secondly, its limited 11 
scope means that even if it is implemented in good faith it does not address a 12 
sufficient range of issues to be properly market-opening. Thirdly, there is 13 
little reason to think that its rights will be harder than those of the Treaty, 14 
since there is a continued avoidance of enforcement and implementation 15 
issues. It is true that the fact of setting rights out in legislation may 16 
encourage a fuller adoption of them than would be the case if they remained 17 
products of case law, but given the limitations of the substance of the 18 
directive this is not enough to rebut the conclusion that the directive does not 19 
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provide sufficient or even particularly significant legal support for free 1 
movement. 2 
E. Does the directive take the law any further? 3 
The chapter on freedom of establishment is in substance an enactment of the 4 
Court’s interpretation of Article 49 TFEU.344. It requires, as does the Treaty, 5 
in the view of the Court, that measures restricting access to the provision of 6 
a service as an established person must be justified by the pursuit of a 7 
legitimate interest, necessary for this, and proportionate. The chapter sets out 8 
lists of examples of measures which would be prohibited and which should 9 
be regarded with suspicion, but there is nothing in these lists which would 10 
surprise a lawyer345. The prohibited measures are ones that have long been 11 
prohibited as a result of judgments of the Court. The doubtful ones are to be 12 
assessed in the light of the principles of justification and proportionality 13 
again. 14 
Thus while the codification of the case law may have a certain 15 
clarificatory value, this should not be overstated. The codification has been 16 
done in a relatively banal way, with the most obvious points being spelt out, 17 
but the more difficult points – what exactly is necessary and/or 18 
proportionate? – continuing to be left open. The room for interpretation, 19 
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dispute, and de facto restriction of movement is therefore little changed from 1 
what it was before the directive346. 2 
The services chapter has attracted attention for its appearance of 3 
progress. While no longer referring to the country of origin principle, it 4 
essentially maintains it in substance. It restricts the application of host State 5 
service rules to foreign providers to such an extent that they are in principle, 6 
within the sphere of the directive, almost as good as exclusively regulated by 7 
their home State. Host State rules can only be applied where justified by 8 
public policy, security, health or the environment, and the probability is, 9 
given the way these concepts have been interpreted in the past, that they will 10 
continue to be strictly enough interpreted that one may speak of exceptional 11 
derogations from the general rule of exclusive home State control. 12 
Yet, alongside this far-reaching general idea a number of provisos 13 
must be placed. Not least is the fact that the difference between the country 14 
of origin principle and the existing Treaty rules interpreted into Article 56 15 
TFEU is not so great. Currently Member States are entitled to apply national 16 
measures to foreign service providers wherever justified, necessary and 17 
proportionate, which seems open-ended, but in practice the Court has been 18 
restrictive, and the litigation success rate of States is low. While, for 19 
example, consumer protection is often cited as a reason for restricting 20 
market access which the services directive takes away, there are few cases in 21 
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which it has actually been successfully relied upon347. Thus the legal 1 
principle contained in the directive is really very close in practice to the 2 
legal principle found in the existing case law – the more extensive 3 
derogations from free movement which are presently permitted tend to be 4 
unsuccessful anyway348. 5 
Nevertheless, the fact that these cases on consumer protection were 6 
brought indicates that the open-ended justifications which the case law 7 
permits provided an opportunity for conservatism on the part of States. 8 
Given that, as it has been argued above that the commercial disadvantages of 9 
litigation often give States effective ownership of open-ended concepts, 10 
removing some of those concepts is likely to aid free movement. However, 11 
this is mitigated by the fact that as a result of narrowing the category of 12 
exemptions to free movement, the ones that remain are likely to become 13 
more contested. If public policy remains the only justification for derogation 14 
then we will probably see States straining to expand this concept and 15 
bringing ever more arguments within it349. Since the limits and definitions of 16 
public policy are as potentially open-textured as any others – ‘sufficiently 17 
serious threat to a fundamental interest of society, ‘interpreted strictly’, 18 
‘proportionate’ (…)350 – the challenge of preventing national authorities 19 
from misusing interpretative spaces for an over-restrictive approach to free 20 
movement has not been met. 21 
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A criticism of both the establishment and services chapter is that they 1 
only appear to apply to a limited class of public measures: those restricting 2 
‘access to a service activity’351. This may be contrasted with the broader 3 
Treaty prohibition which, in the eyes of the Court, covers ‘any measure 4 
which may hinder or make less attractive’ the exercise of free movement352. 5 
The distinction lies in measures which do not directly concern access to a 6 
service activity as such, but do in fact make it harder to provide services 7 
abroad. These could be aspects of planning rules, the legal system, vehicle 8 
and property use, the integration of the family of the service providers, and 9 
tax issues, to which the directive will not apply. Given that services are 10 
provided by people or organisations which must exist as people or 11 
organisations, as well as engaging in their service activity pur sang, the 12 
directive is not wide enough in scope to function as a real market opener353. 13 
It does not even pretend to address the full range of legal factors which in 14 
fact make it harder to supply services abroad. As a result, service providers 15 
will often have to fall back on the Treaty articles to establish the legal rights 16 
necessary for their activities, an undesirably messy legislative position354. 17 
F. Enforcement and implementation again 18 
Although the directive does not substantially develop the substantive law, 19 
and is even narrower than the Treaty in some ways, it may stimulate national 20 
authorities to take account of free movement rights simply by virtue of being 21 
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a directive, explicitly addressed to them355. Commanding the attention of the 1 
national regulator is a useful, if insufficient, step in enforcing the law. 2 
The administrative provisions of the directive may also help with 3 
practical enforceability. These require States to make the administrative 4 
procedures associated with access to a service activity ‘sufficiently simple’, 5 
and accessible via a single point of contact, which must include an online 6 
contact point356. This should make it easier for service providers to establish 7 
what their legal position is, and encourage them to assert rights. An assertive 8 
approach is more probable where providers have a clear line of 9 
communication with the authorities, and do not feel lost in a sea of 10 
bureaucracy. 11 
Nevertheless, these are rearguard arguments. Neither the mere fact of 12 
being written law, nor the simplification of the bureaucracy associated with 13 
cross-border movement address directly the continued weaknesses and 14 
ambiguities of the substantive law. It is difficult to believe that the delays 15 
and difficulties associated with dealing with local authorities are in 16 
themselves a significant enough obstacle to movement that addressing them 17 
in this procedural way will fundamentally change the level of market 18 
integration. 19 
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V. The services directive as a mechanism for inter-state 1 
co-operation 2 
The services directive may not provide adequate free movement rights 3 
directly, but it does create mechanisms through which Member States can 4 
communicate with each other about issues and concerns relevant to service 5 
activities357. Looking at these mechanisms in the light of theories about 6 
competition suggests they may be effective in helping create inter-State 7 
consensus over levels and types of regulation and in helping States accept 8 
each others’ rules and service providers. The directive may therefore 9 
contribute to free movement via an indirect – second order – mechanism. It 10 
can be seen as a type of reflexive law, encouraging States to react 11 
constructively to each other and converge voluntarily and flexibly358. 12 
G. A regulatory oligopoly 13 
The starting point for this perspective is a view of Member States as sellers 14 
on a market for regulation; each State offers its rules and hopes that this will 15 
attract and stimulate economic actors, who will use the State as a base for 16 
their service provision throughout the EU359. This is often described in terms 17 
of regulatory competition, and it is the fear of many that such competition 18 
between States may lead to a race to the bottom360. Precisely, the hard free 19 
movement rights to which the directive is often presented as containing raise 20 
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this risk, because they make it possible for companies to choose their State 1 
of establishment independently of the location of their customers. 2 
However, not all markets function perfectly, and the market for 3 
regulation within the EU has some of the characteristics of an oligopoly – a 4 
relatively small number of providers dominate the market. In this case, the 5 
number of providers of regulation has a ceiling of the number of EU 6 
Member States. 7 
In oligopolistic markets the risk arises that the providers either 8 
collude – form a conscious cartel – or that they engage in non-collusive 9 
parallel behaviour – they converge in products and prices even without 10 
explicit agreement to do so361. The result of either path may be that the 11 
providers collectively take on the characteristics of a dominant market actor, 12 
able to act to a significant extent independently of consumers – who are in 13 
this case the service providers subject to the regulation362. The risk of 14 
regulatory competition, by contrast, is that States become enslaved to 15 
migrating companies, who can dictate the terms of regulation363. The reply 16 
in terms of oligopoly is that by collusion or natural parallel behaviour States 17 
may once again assert their independence of those companies, and be able to 18 
act in their own interests – or those of their voters. 19 
However, such oligopolistic parallelism does not happen in all 20 
markets. A number of factors make it more or less likely364. The first of 21 
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these is the number of sellers in the market, and on the whole a smaller 1 
group is more likely to act as one than a larger group. The number of 2 
Member States in the EU, currently 27, is on the high side for either 3 
collusion or parallelism. However, for many kinds of service the EU may 4 
not be one market. For reasons of infrastructure, language, the availability of 5 
staff, physical location, among other issues, not every jurisdiction will be 6 
able to plausibly compete for the headquarters of all service providers. Thus 7 
for any given service in any given part of the EU there may be a smaller 8 
number of jurisdictions that are realistic options for establishment, and that 9 
are therefore in competition with each other. The EU may in fact consist of 10 
multiple smaller overlapping services markets. 11 
A second factor which is considered to make collusion or parallel 12 
behaviour much more likely is the availability of information about what 13 
competitors are doing. It is sometimes possible for parallel behaviour to 14 
occur entirely without contact between firms if one makes clear pricing and 15 
policy announcements, and so behaves as leader for the others, who 16 
understand implicitly and independently that it is in their interests to follow 17 
the leader rather than undercut it. If there is contact between market actors 18 
this increases further the chance of non-competition. 19 
A large part of the services directive is devoted to increasing 20 
transparency and making information about regulatory demands available365. 21 
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The administrative chapter is aimed at making requirements clear for service 1 
providers366, but if the information is ‘out there’ on clear websites, as is the 2 
intention, it will be equally available to the authorities of other States. It 3 
seems plausible that at the moment most national authorities have relatively 4 
little knowledge of the details of regulatory requirements of other States, and 5 
the publication of the details to providers will also raise the level of 6 
information available to sister-authorities significantly. Additionally, the 7 
directive contains provisions requiring communications networks to be set 8 
up between national regulatory and supervisory authorities367. This is 9 
expressed to be primarily for the purpose of assisting each other with the 10 
supervision of specific providers, and exchanging information about 11 
reputability and so on. However, the fact that channels of communication 12 
are being created and kept open is likely to lead to an enhanced 13 
understanding of each other’s regulatory content, methods, and philosophy 14 
in general, as well as of plans for changes and developments. Almost 15 
inevitably, the creation of this network will be the beginning – or in some 16 
cases further development – of a conversation between regulatory 17 
authorities. 18 
The third of the major factors determining the behaviour of 19 
oligopolists is the possibility to sanction members who depart from the 20 
terms of (implicit) agreements. The cartel that can sanction its members is 21 
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much more stable than one which cannot, while if there is a potential price 1 
to be paid for non-parallel behaviour then market actors are more likely to 2 
continue along the parallel path. 3 
Here the weakness of the services directive – that it does not actually 4 
guarantee free movement – becomes one of its key points. Under the regime 5 
that it introduces free movement continues to be conditional upon the good 6 
will of the host State, for all the reasons discussed above. However, the 7 
conversation about free movement is, as a result of the communicative 8 
provisions of the directive, no longer just between the service provider and 9 
the host State, but between national authorities. These speak to each other 10 
directly about service regulation, and so implicitly, and probably explicitly, 11 
about access to each others’ markets. Free movement was never guaranteed, 12 
and is still not guaranteed, but has changed from being conditional, to being 13 
negotiated. As authorities speak to each other they learn of each others’ 14 
concerns – and these are probably largely shared – and of the reasons each 15 
may have to take a restrictive approach to service providers, and are capable 16 
of adapting to these reasons either by providing information to allay fears, or 17 
by adapting rules to meet concerns, or by offering deals – you take it easy on 18 
our management consultants and we’ll not be too difficult about your 19 
architects. All of these strategies are likely to be used together, so that each 20 
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State is effectively engaged in negotiating market access with its fellow 1 
member States. 2 
The sanction is then that a States which chooses to go its own 3 
regulatory way, without concern for the consensus of other States, may find 4 
that its providers have difficulty operating in other States. This need not be 5 
as a result of any conscious retribution. However, if there is a regulatory 6 
consensus about the proper level of protection or types of acceptable 7 
constraint, then a State will feel more confident and justified in interpreting 8 
e.g. public policy, justification or proportionality in a way that excludes 9 
providers departing notably from this consensus, or subject to a supervisory 10 
jurisdiction that does so. There is safety in numbers, and the possibility for 11 
consensus between many States makes it more likely and more defensible 12 
that non-conforming States will pay a price in market access. Added to this 13 
may be a price in political isolation. States playing the regulatory 14 
competition game at its hardest will not be pleased if other States are able to 15 
form a well-informed oppositional front. One may note finally that 16 
communicated consensus between States may strengthen their position even 17 
if service providers – or the Commission – do choose to litigate. The Court 18 
of Justice must itself then interpret the open norms, and a broad European 19 
consensus for a certain view is likely to carry more weight than an argument 20 
from a uniquely mono-national point of view. 21 
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H. Collusion or democratic co-operation? 1 
The outcome of an oligopolistic market with high levels of communication 2 
and sanction is likely to be, in the absence of countervailing factors, co-3 
ordinated behaviour368. In the context of a market for regulation it seems 4 
likely that some degree of convergence of regulation will occur, as States 5 
realize that locating their regulation within a consensus band is in their own 6 
interests, as it prevents competition between them. 7 
In a conventional market this would be seen as undesirable. 8 
However, in a conventional market the concern is usually to maximize the 9 
welfare of consumers, and to prevent sellers from organizing to hinder that 10 
goal. In a context of regulatory competition matters change somewhat. The 11 
consumers of laws are service providers, whose welfare is a concern, but by 12 
no means the exclusive or even major concern of policy in this area. By 13 
contrast, the end consumers of the services are democratically represented in 14 
the States – the sellers of law – giving these a legitimacy that they do not 15 
have in a normal market. The situation requires more careful analysis. 16 
In the absence of international trade rules, States can make their own 17 
trade-offs between the costs and benefits associated with opening their 18 
markets, and different levels of regulation369. Low regulation may stimulate 19 
economic activity, but bring unwelcome consequences. High regulation may 20 
serve some consumer interests, but hinder economic activity. Opening the 21 
 B  
Chapter 3 
Gareth Davies 
Page 260 of 936 
XML Typescript © Cambridge University Press – Generated by Integra Software Services. 
LIAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
national market to foreign providers may create the risk of domestic 1 
producers locating abroad where regulation is lighter, but may also result in 2 
increased domestic competition and lower prices. All are legitimate factors 3 
to take into account. 4 
However, if trade rules constrain a State to open its markets at least 5 
to some non-trivial extent – as both the Treaty the directive do – then that 6 
State loses the capacity to balance interests exclusively according to the 7 
preferences of its population370. One may hope that the joining of the trade 8 
area and the submission to the trade rule is a preference of the population, so 9 
that this is a non-issue, but in practice it is never quite so simple; populations 10 
would ideally like to be members of the trade area but not take all the 11 
consequences all of the time. 12 
Giving States the capacity to co-operate and thereby gain a certain 13 
independence of migrating companies restores some balance to their policy-14 
making capacity. If the goal is that States are able to make policy reflecting 15 
the preferences of their populations then it may be advantageous. Yet while 16 
the resulting convergence to a consensus may reflect preferences better than 17 
an unfettered race to the bottom would, it may nevertheless not be optimal. 18 
The tendency of colluding sellers is to keep prices too high, and the 19 
tendency of co-operating States, freed from pressure from the consumers of 20 
their laws, may be to undervalue the advantages of limited regulation, and 21 
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overvalue their own institutional interests in a strong State-administered 1 
regulatory system. 2 
I. Variable and flexible co-operation 3 
An apparently attractive aspect of the situation created by the directive is 4 
that it allows for variation and change within the overall framework of a 5 
movement towards consensus. A State that wishes to go its own regulatory 6 
path is still able to in any given area, while converging on others, provided it 7 
is prepared to accept the possible price in access and isolation. While the 8 
result of communication may be convergence, this is voluntary, and so 9 
reversible. Moreover, it need not be full convergence; the degree to which 10 
States are prepared to accept diversity is negotiable and dynamic, and may 11 
change and broaden as they come to understand each other better. Initial 12 
reactions to mutual learning may be an eagerness to agree terms, but as trust 13 
deepens States may be more and more able to accept divergent regulation. 14 
Collusion is an utterly flexible mechanism. 15 
VI. Conclusions 16 
It is a difficult empirical question, beyond the scope of this article or the 17 
expertise of its author, whether communication and co-operation between 18 
States will in fact lead to optimal regulation or how far it will diverge from 19 
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the optimum. However, whatever the outcomes, three a priori points may be 1 
made about the mechanisms involved, based on the preceding discussion: 2 
Firstly, the relationship between the directive and the market for 3 
services is not what it is commonly presented to be. The 4 
conventional presentation is that the directive creates free movement; 5 
this leads to regulatory competition, which in turn may lead to 6 
agreement to Commission-led harmonisation. In fact, it is suggested 7 
that a more important sequence will be as follows: authorities 8 
communicate and learn about each other, this leads to convergence 9 
of regulation and acceptance of regulation, and as a result they open 10 
their markets to each others’ providers. Limited voluntary 11 
harmonisation therefore leads to free movement, rather than free 12 
movement leading to traditional EU harmonisation. 13 
Secondly, the absence of the EU or the Commission in the 14 
mechanism described is striking. While the directive envisages that 15 
the States and the Commission will together form an information 16 
network with a view to harmonisation where necessary, in fact the 17 
role of the Commission may be marginalized. If States are able to 18 
work together then they may see no need for true harmonisation, and 19 
resist the loss of autonomy and flexibility that it entails. 20 
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Thirdly, it is open to doubt whether an oligopolistic market for 1 
regulation is optimal, but it is worth noting that this market will be a 2 
dynamic and unstable one. The States collectively gain power as a 3 
result of co-operation, but that does not mean that actors such as 4 
firms and the Commission are entirely removed of influence. For one 5 
thing, even where there is a functioning consensus there is likely to 6 
be relative dissatisfaction in some States, who would rather locate 7 
the consensus elsewhere. Thus a role for traditional harmonization, 8 
or intervention from Brussels is not completely absent. By strategic 9 
intervention both the Commission and industry lobbies can do 10 
something to counteract a possible tendency among colluding States 11 
to over-value selected interests and ignore others. 12 
In summary, trust, legislation, mutual recognition and market-making are 13 
inter-dependent. Developments in one affect all of the others. Effective 14 
legislation or policy uses this fact to achieve indirect – second order – as 15 
well as direct results. The Services Directive provides only a mildly 16 
reformed framework for substantive mutual recognition, but a greatly 17 
enhanced framework for trust and communication. It seems likely that this 18 
will contribute to the effectiveness of mutual recognition and market 19 
operation, and ultimately promote more selective, but more achievable and 20 
useful, and perhaps often voluntary, harmonisation.21 
Chapter 3 
Gareth Davies 
Page 264 of 936 
XML Typescript © Cambridge University Press – Generated by Integra Software Services. 
LIAN 
                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
313
 This formulation is taken from the presentation by Prof. R. Bachmann at 
the Modern Law Review workshop on The Regulation of Trade in 
Services: ‘Trust, Distrust and Economic Integration’, held in London and 
Cambridge in June 2009. I am grateful to the participants of this workshop 
for discussion and comments. 
314
 K. Nicolaidis, ‘Trusting the Poles? Creating European through Mutual 
Recognition’, JEPP 14(5) (2007), 682–698, p. 683. 
315
 Ibid. 
316
 W. Kerber and R. van den Bergh ‘Mutual recognition revisited: 
misunderstandings, inconsistencies and a suggested reinterpretation’ 
Kyklos 61 (2008) 447–465; G. Davies ‘Is Mutual Recognition an 
Alternative to Harmonisation? Lessons in Tolerance and Trade from the 
European Union for the WTO and other RTAs’ in: F. Ortino and L. 
Bartels (eds.) Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO (Oxford: OUP, 
2006) pp. 265–280. 
317
 G. Davies ‘Is Mutual Recognition an Alternative to Harmonisation? 
Lessons in Tolerance and Trade from the European Union for the WTO 
and other RTAs’, above. 
318
 K. Nicolaidis, above, p. 683. 
Chapter 3 
Trust and Mutual Recognition in the Services Directive 
Page 265 of 936 
XML Typescript © Cambridge University Press – Generated by Integra Software Services. 
LIAN 
                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
319
 Ibid. 
320
 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
services in the Internal Market OJ (2006) L 376/76. 
321
 Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165; Case C-76/90 Säger and 
Dennemeyer [1991] ECR I-4221. 
322
 S. Weatherill, ‘Protecting the Consumer Interest in an Integrated Services 
Market’, Mitchell Working Paper 1/2007, available at 
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/file_download/series/23_promotingtheconsumeri
nterestinanintegratedservicesmarket.pdf, 2 (last visited September 26, 
2010). 
323
 Case 279/80 Webb [1981] ECR 3305. 
324
 Case C-58/98 Corsten [2000] ECR I-1919. 
325
 Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon [1979] ECR 649; S. Weatherill, EU 
Consumer Law and Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2005). 
326
 Eg. Case C-422/01 Skandia [2003] ECR I-6817; Case C-281/06 Jundt 
[2007] ECR I-12231. 
327
 See S. Weatherill, ‘Protecting the Consumer Interest in an Integrated 
Services Market’, above, pp. 12–15. 
328
 Ibid. 
329
 G. Davies, ‘Abstractness and Concreteness in the Preliminary Reference 
Procedure’ in: N. Nic Shuibhne (ed.) Regulating the Internal Market 
Chapter 3 
Gareth Davies 
Page 266 of 936 
XML Typescript © Cambridge University Press – Generated by Integra Software Services. 
LIAN 
                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006) pp. 233–236 (also available as ‘The 
Division of Powers between the European Court of Justice and National 
Courts’ on ssrn.com). 
330
 See generally F. Snyder, ‘The Effectiveness of European Community 
Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques’, MLR, 56(1) (1993), 
19–54. 
331
 S. Weatherill, ‘Protecting the Consumer Interest in an Integrated Services 
Market’, above, pp. 12–15; J. Pelkmans, ‘Deepening Services Market 
Integration – a Critical Assessment’, Romanian Journal of European 
Affairs, 7(4) (2007), 5–32, section 4.2 (also available on ssrn.com); B. De 
Witte ‘Setting the Scene: How did Services get to Bolkestein and Why?’ 
Mitchell Working Paper 3/2007, available at 
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/file_download/series/28_settingthescenehowdids
ervicesgettobolkesteinandwhy.pdf , 6–7 (last visited September 26, 2010). 
332
 See S. Prechal ‘Free Movement and Procedural Requirements: 
Proportionality Reconsidered’, LIEI 35 (2008), 201–216; C. Barnard, 
‘Unravelling the Services Directive’, CMLRev, 45 (2008), 323–394, 
pp. 354–356. 
333
 Case C-224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I-10239; Cases C-46 and 48/93 
Brasserie du Pecheur [1996] ECR I-1029; Case C-129/00 Commission v 
Italy [2003] ECR I-14637. 
Chapter 3 
Trust and Mutual Recognition in the Services Directive 
Page 267 of 936 
XML Typescript © Cambridge University Press – Generated by Integra Software Services. 
LIAN 
                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
334
 M. Jarvis, Application of EC Law by National Courts: Free Movement of 
Goods (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 220–221. 
335
 Eg. Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments [1995] ECR I-1141; Case C-
134/04 Commission v Italy [2007] ECR I-6251; Cases C-94/04 and C-
202/04 Cipolla and Others [2006] ECR I-11421. 
336
 See E. T. Beller, ‘The Headscarf Affair: The Conseil d’État on the Role 
of Religion and Culture in French Society’, Texas International Law 
Journal, 39 (2004), 581–623; T. J. Gunn, ‘Religious Freedom and Laïcité: 
A Comparison of the United States and France’, Brigham Young 
University Law Review, (2004) 419–506; M. Mahlmann, ‘Religious 
tolerance, Pluralist Society and the Neutrality of the State: The Federal 
Constitutional Court’s Decision in the Headscarf Case’, German Law 
Journal, vol. 4 issue 11 (2003), 1099–1116. 
337
 Ibid. 
338
 See B. de Witte, ‘Setting the Scene: How did Services get to Bolkestein 
and Why?’, above, pp. 9–10. 
339
 See J-M. Sun and J. Pelkmans, ‘Regulatory Competition in the Single 
Market’, JCMS, 33 (1995), 67–89. 
340
 See F. Scharpf, ‘Economic Integration, Democracy and the Welfare 
State’, JEPP, 4 (1997) ,18–36. 
Chapter 3 
Gareth Davies 
Page 268 of 936 
XML Typescript © Cambridge University Press – Generated by Integra Software Services. 
LIAN 
                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
341
 K. Nicolaidis and G. Schaffer, ‘Transnational Mutual Recognition 
Schemes: Governance without Global Government’, Law and 
Contemporary Problems, 68 (2005), 263–317. 
342
 See K. Nicolaidis, ‘Trusting the Poles? Creating European through 
Mutual Recognition’, JEPP 14(5) (2007), 682–698. 
343
 See G. Davies, ‘Abstractness and Concreteness in the Preliminary 
Reference Procedure’, above, p. 232. 
344
 There is a consensus on this. See eg. S. Weatherill, ‘Protecting the 
Consumer Interest in an Integrated Services Market’, above; C. Barnard, 
‘Unravelling the Services Directive’, above; S. Griller ‘The Services 
Directive: Two Steps Forward, How Many Back’ in: F. Breuss, G. Fink 
and S. Griller Services Liberalisation in the Internal Market (Vienna: 
Springer, 2008) p. 225. 
345
 Articles 9–15, Directive 2006/123. 
346
 S. Weatherill, ‘Protecting the Consumer Interest in an Integrated Services 
Market’, above, pp. 12–15; J. Pelkmans, ‘Deepening Services Market 
Integration – a Critical Assessment’, above, Section 4.2; S. Griller, ‘The 
Services Directive: Two Steps Forward, How Many Back’, above. 
347
 C. Barnard, ‘Unravelling the Services Directive’, above, p. 367; S. 
Weatherill, ‘Protecting the Consumer Interest in an Integrated Services 
Market’, above, p. 2. 
Chapter 3 
Trust and Mutual Recognition in the Services Directive 
Page 269 of 936 
XML Typescript © Cambridge University Press – Generated by Integra Software Services. 
LIAN 
                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
348
 Similarly, V. Hatzopoulos, ‘Legal Aspects in Establishing the Internal 
Market for Services’, College of Europe Research Paper in Law 6/2007. 
349
 C. Barnard, ‘Unravelling the Services Directive’, above, p. 366. Cf. the 
plausible argument popular on the continent that the mandatory 
requirements will and should be interpreted into Article 16 just as they 
were interpreted into the almost identically worded Article 49 EC; V. 
Hatzopoulos, Legal Aspects in Establishing the Internal Market for 
Services’, above; J. Pelkmans, ‘Deepening Services Market Integration – 
a Critical Assessment’, above ; G. Davies ‘The Services Directive: 
Extending the Country of Origin Principle and Reforming Public 
Administration’, ELRev., 32 (2007), 232–245, p. pp. 235. 
350
 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen [2004] ECR I-9609. 
351
 Article 9(1); Article 16(1). 
352
 Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1995] ECR I-4165. 
353
 Cf. C. Barnard, ‘Unravelling the Services Directive’, above, pp. 336–339. 
354
 See also C. Barnard, ‘Unravelling the Services Directive’, above, 
pp. 343–344. 
355
 Ibid., pp. 393–394. 
356
 Article 5–8. 
357
 See Articles 28–36. See also Articles 7 and 21. 
Chapter 3 
Gareth Davies 
Page 270 of 936 
XML Typescript © Cambridge University Press – Generated by Integra Software Services. 
LIAN 
                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
358
 S. Deakin, ‘Two Types of Regulatory Competition: Competitive 
Federalism versus Reflexive Harmonisation. A Law and Economics 
Perspective on Centros’, CYELS, 2 (1999), 231–260. 
359
 See generally, A. Ogus, ‘Competition between National Legal Systems: 
A Contribution of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law’, ICLQ, 45 
(1999), 405–418. 
360
 For an overview in the EU context see, C. Barnard and S. Deakin, 
‘Market Access and Regulatory Competition’ Jean Monnet Working 
Paper 09/01, available at 
http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/01/012701.html (last visited 
.September 26, 2010) 
361
 See eg. G. Monti, EC Competition Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2007), pp. 308–311. 
362
 See A. Ogus, ‘Competition between National Legal Systems: A 
Contribution of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law’, above. The 
definition of dominance is from Case 85/76 Hoffman La Roche [1979] 
ECR 461. See also G. Monti, ‘The Concept of Dominance’, European 
Competition Journal, 2 (2006), 31–52. 
363
 See C. Barnard and S. Deakin, ‘Market Access and Regulatory 
Competition’, above. 
Chapter 3 
Trust and Mutual Recognition in the Services Directive 
Page 271 of 936 
XML Typescript © Cambridge University Press – Generated by Integra Software Services. 
LIAN 
                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
364
 See A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law 3rd ed. (Oxford: OUP, 
2008), pp. 871–873. 
365
 See Articles 7, 21, 28–36. 
366
 Chapter II of the Services Directive. 
367
 See Articles 28(2), 32(2), 34. 
368
 See footnote n 52 above. 
369
 See J-M. Sun and J. Pelkmans ‘Regulatory Competition in the Single 
Market’, above; R. van den Bergh, ‘Towards an Institutional Legal 
Framework for Regulatory Competition in Europe’, Kyklos 53 (2000), 
435–466; M. Trebilcock and R. Howse, ‘Trade Liberalisation and 
Regulatory Diversity: Reconciling Competitive Markets with Competitive 
Politics’, European Journal of Law and Economics, 6 (1998), 5–37; J. 
Trachtman, ‘International Regulatory Competition, Externalisation, and 
Jurisdiction’, Harvard International Law Journal, 34 (1993), 47–104. 
370
 Ibid. 
